Actually if the helicopter had a loss of tail rotor efctiveness (LTE) it could very well still fly straight. In fact, most helicopters are designed to fly straight ahead at a certain speed without a tail rotor. At flat pitch there is very little torque moment applied to the airframe. Torque is also aerodynamically countered by the vertical stabilizer, but only when forward airspeed is maintained.

(Written on 09/03/2012)(Permalink)

Pretty sure as someone said above, the actual seats have been removed and those are the mounting points. Notice that the rear crew seats are missing also..

(Written on 19/07/2011)(Permalink)

They're not really sitting in those seats in a gravitational environment for very long are they? Few hours for launch then a few minutes for landing - the rest they don't weigh anything. Hardly seems worth engineering a big bulky heavy comfortable seat for, when that payload could be offset to carry useful load into orbit!

(Written on 15/07/2011)(Permalink)

For the purposes, could you clarify what "automated enroute markers" are? I'm having a difficult time understanding what... or how one could be better at providing safe separation of air traffic than a controller. The reason the agency says that it used to be this way is because now it's different. Controllers are at airports because they reduce the risk to the flying public. Removing controllers and reducing service does no benefit to this public. Keep in mind that if you relocate a controller from podunk Iowa to JFK then that controller becomes as beneficial to the facility as a new hire. Every controller progresses through the training program and requires the same on the job training to become a FPL controller at the facility. Facilities are already overworked and understaffed - adding new trainees to be "babysat" as a controller will define it, when those CPCs are already working overtime fatigued does not solve the problem.

(Written on 15/04/2011)(Permalink)

Perhaps we wouldn't be having the discussion, but the controllers, the union, and the agency have been having the discussion for quite some time. Rotating shift schedules, a lack of new trainees, and large numbers of retiring controllers have led to employee shortages and fatigued employees at many facilities (many which require controllers to work mandatory overtime). Reducing the service the FAA provides to less busy airports shouldn't be the answer either - how does that accomplish the agency mission of providing a high quality service to the flying public?

(Written on 15/04/2011)(Permalink)

How would the installation of a “dead man switch” fix the issue? Sure, it wakes up one sleeping controller (and annoys hundreds of others), but should the agency not be more concerned with mitigating the organizational shortfalls that permit fatigued controllers to report to work?

(Written on 15/04/2011)(Permalink)

@N136EH - Tell me, how exactly did the 737 "help out"? Further, what disciplinary action could possibly be warranted towards the cirrus pilot?

(Written on 01/04/2011)(Permalink)

@fabere Their intentions were good, their execution was risky. The supervisor will keep his job, but the message will be sent: Accepting avoidable risk is not tolerated. Why is this so difficult to swallow?

(Written on 01/04/2011)(Permalink)

@ffdriver My question to you would be this: In 1976 what caused the Beechcraft to crash into the mountains? Would having another aircraft fly up next to him have prevented the accident? Saying "is that what you want" in a scenario that is obviously in no way parallel is not going to prove your point. A cirrus flying level at 11,000 feet over Florida is, I dare say, not likely to crash into a mountain. If the issue does turn out to be that the cirrus was listening to Jax Center instead of MCO approach, then the scenario could have played out with much less risk had the supervisor asked the center to try contacting the cirrus on their frequencies. I'm not saying that any accident is worth having. An accident is not possible without first accepting unnecessary risk. That's the definition of a hazard, and I'd personally prefer to be assured that the NAS I fly in is as hazard free as possible.

(Written on 01/04/2011)(Permalink)

@mrdedwalker Surgeons are highly equipped professional people, yet they perform wrong side surgery and close up incisions with tools left inside. The point of procedures isn't to cause accidents, but to mitigate the risk of solving them. In this case, had the controller followed applicable procedures for dealing with a loss of communication aircraft (which likely would have included asking Jax Center to try contacting him) the scenario could have played out like those that occur reasonably frequently - with the pilot switching to the correct frequency. The risk involved with formation flight of an aircraft not in communication and a passenger carrying airliner should far *outweigh* the uncertainty of a cirrus not talking to the controller!

(Written on 01/04/2011)(Permalink)